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2945 
A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT TO CLASS 
PROCEEDINGS:  THE FALSE CONFLICT 
BETWEEN THE FAA AND NLRA 
Michael D. Schwartz* 
 
In recent decades, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Federal Arbitration Act 
jurisprudence has greatly expanded the scope of enforceable arbitration 
agreements.  In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, decided in 2011, the 
Court held that a class arbitration waiver in a consumer contract was 
enforceable, despite state law to the contrary.  In January 2012, the 
National Labor Relations Board ruled that, despite the Court’s holding in 
Concepcion, class waivers in employment arbitration agreements are 
unenforceable due to employees’ right under the National Labor Relations 
Act to engage in concerted activity.  However, nearly all federal and state 
courts that have subsequently considered this question have declined to 
follow the NLRB and have enforced similar class waivers. 
This Note argues that the NLRB was correct in declaring unenforceable 
class waivers in employment arbitration agreements.  It concludes that 
because employees’ right to invoke class proceedings under the NLRA is a 
substantive rather than procedural right, the unwaivability of this right 
creates no conflict with the FAA, even under the Supreme Court’s broad 
interpretation of the statute. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Arbitration Act1 (FAA) makes contractual agreements to 
arbitrate, with limited exception, “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”2  In 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,3 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a 
consumer arbitration agreement requiring that claims be brought in the 
parties’ “individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any 
purported class or representative proceeding,”4 was enforceable under the 
FAA.5  Further, the Court invalidated a California law that rendered such 
terms in an adhesion contract unconscionable.6  Because the Court enforced 
the agreement as written, the plaintiffs were barred from invoking classwide 
proceedings, whether in litigation or arbitration. 
Concepcion seemingly opened the door for employers to structure their 
arbitration agreements, which currently cover millions of employees,7 to 
 
 1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2006). 
 2. Id. § 2. 
 3. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 4. Id. at 1744. 
 5. Id. at 1753. 
 6. Id. 
 7. At least thirty million employees work under employment contracts containing 
arbitration agreements. Nantiya Ruan, What’s Left To Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration 
Mandates that Bar Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers 22 (Univ. of Denver Sturm 
Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 12-36, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2159963. 
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exclude the use of class proceedings for the resolution of all future 
disputes.8  Recently, however, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
ruled that employees’ right under the National Labor Relations Act9 
(NLRA) “to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”10 includes an 
unwaivable, substantive right to utilize classwide procedures to resolve 
employment disputes.11 
The question, then, is how to reconcile the NLRA’s guarantee of 
employees’ right to invoke classwide proceedings with Concepcion’s 
requirement of enforcing arbitration agreements that waive this right.  Put 
another way:  is an arbitration agreement that precludes classwide 
procedures in an employment action enforceable? 
This Note addresses the enforceability of class waivers in employment 
arbitration agreements.  It argues that the NLRA’s protection of concerted 
activities, which includes the right to invoke classwide proceedings, renders 
such waivers unenforceable, because employees’ right to pursue concerted 
activity is a substantive right that cannot be waived in an arbitration 
agreement, not a procedural right that can properly be restricted in an 
arbitration agreement.12  The NLRB correctly reached this result, but its 
diffuse reasoning failed to home in on the critical distinction between 
substantive and procedural rights.  Courts that have addressed this question, 
many of which hold class waivers enforceable, have also largely ignored 
this essential analysis. 
This Note aims to fill that void and explain why the right to invoke 
classwide proceedings, while correctly viewed as a procedural right in other 
contexts, is nonetheless a substantive right in the context of employment 
contracts governed by the NLRA.  This analysis is necessary to understand 
why the NLRA does not conflict with the FAA, the primary concern of the 
numerous courts that enforced class waivers. 
 
 8. See Kevin B. Leblang & Robert N. Holtzman, Waivers of Class and Collective 
Claims in Arbitration Agreements:  Recent Developments, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Nov. 
2012, at 22 (“[I]t seems beyond dispute that the Supreme Court has been giving clear 
guidance that employers entering into arbitration agreements with their employees were 
permitted to include class and collective arbitration waivers in their agreements.”). 
 9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006). 
 10. Id. § 157. 
 11. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *4 (Jan. 3, 2012).  The 
case is currently on appeal to the Fifth Circuit. D.R. Horton v. NLRB, No. 12-60031 (5th 
Cir. argued Feb. 5, 2013). 
 12. This Note’s thesis should not be confused with the argument that class waivers are 
invalid where class proceedings are necessary to vindicate a statutory right.  The Supreme 
Court is currently hearing an appeal on this issue in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant. In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 
133 S. Ct. 594 (Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-133).  In the case below, the Second Circuit held that 
a class waiver is unenforceable where “the practical effect of enforcement would be to 
preclude [plaintiffs’] ability to vindicate their federal statutory rights.” Id. at 212.  Whether 
that holding prevails is irrelevant, as here the “practical effect” of a class waiver has no role 
in the analysis. 
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Part I describes the nature and purpose of arbitration, class action 
litigation, and class arbitration, and traces the evolution of the two bodies of 
law that have culminated in the present conflict:  on the one hand, the 
increasingly broad enforcement of arbitration agreements through judicial 
interpretation of the FAA and, on the other hand, the expanding scope of 
employee rights protected by Section 7 of the NLRA.  Part II brings these 
two bodies of law together by reviewing how the NLRB and courts have 
attempted to resolve the apparent conflict.  In D.R. Horton, Inc.,13 the 
NLRB held that a class waiver in an employment agreement violated the 
NLRA and that refusing to enforce the offending term did not conflict with 
the FAA.14  While one federal court followed D.R. Horton and declared a 
similar class waiver unenforceable,15 numerous other courts presented with 
the same question have held that the FAA compels the enforcement of class 
waivers in employment agreements.16 
Part III seeks to resolve this split by undertaking what has thus far been 
missing:  an analysis of the distinction between substantive and procedural 
rights as they relate to class waivers in employment arbitration agreements 
in order to properly understand the relationship between the FAA and 
NLRA.  By way of comparison to a similar divide in the context of choice 
of law and the Erie doctrine, this part explains why Section 7 rights, 
including the right to invoke classwide proceedings, are substantive rights 
outside the domain of the FAA.  Finally, this part describes why this result 
assuages the concerns raised by courts over the reach of the FAA under 
Concepcion and related cases, and thus concludes that employment 
arbitration agreements which waive all forms of classwide proceedings are 
unenforceable. 
I.  STATUTES IN TENSION:  THE FAA AND NLRA 
This part serves two purposes.  First, Parts I.A and I.B define and review 
three foundational concepts:  arbitration, class action, and class arbitration.  
Next, Parts I.C and I.D use these concepts to trace the evolving 
interpretations of the FAA and NLRA, which has resulted in the present 
dispute over the enforceability of class waivers in employment arbitration 
agreements. 
 
 13. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274 (Jan. 3, 2012). 
 14. Id. at *5, *10. 
 15. Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., No. 11-cv-779-bbc, 2012 WL 1242318, at 
*7 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2012). 
 16. See Delock v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., No. 4:11-cv-520-DPM, 2012 WL 
3150391 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 1, 2012); Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038 
(N.D. Cal. 2012); Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012); Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc., 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198 (Ct. App. 
2012); Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372 (Ct. App. 2012), appeal 
docketed, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324 (Cal. Sept. 19, 2012). 
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A.  Arbitration 
Arbitration is an extrajudicial form of dispute resolution in which a 
neutral third party selected by the parties hears arguments, reviews 
evidence, and issues a final and binding decision.17  As with many other 
forms of alternative dispute resolution, arbitration replaces the “default” use 
of litigation to resolve disputes and allows the parties to tailor the 
procedures used to resolve their dispute in a manner thought to be most 
beneficial to their needs.18  The parties can agree to maintain some of the 
procedural rules governing litigation in a judicial forum, while choosing to 
abandon or alter other rules.19  For example, parties outside of a judicial 
forum may opt to waive some or all of the rules of discovery or the rules of 
evidence.20 
Parties often employ arbitration to resolve disputes because it affords 
many of the advantages of litigation at a lower cost to the parties.21  An 
arbitration proceeding occurs before a fair and impartial professional, 
mutually selected by the parties, who has expertise in the relevant area of 
law.22  The parties can tailor the proceedings to contain as many or as few 
procedural requirements as they desire, thus creating (at least in theory) a 
more efficient, expeditious, and inexpensive form of justice.23  However, 
use of arbitration, particularly in the employment context, raises many 
practical concerns due to the significant power imbalance that often exists 
between employer and employee, thus perhaps belying the perceived 
benefits of arbitration.24 
 
 17. See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 7 (1992); R. Gaull Silberman et 
al., Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment Discrimination Claims, 54 LA. L. REV. 
1533, 1537 (1994); see also S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of 
Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 201, 243–45 (2012). 
 18. See Silberman et al., supra note 17, at 1539. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Norman T. Braslow, Contractual Stipulation for Judicial Review and Discovery 
in United States-Japan Arbitration Contracts, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 659, 667 (2004) 
(“[A]rbitration can be considerably less expensive because there is far less discovery than is 
generally permitted in litigation”); David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by 
Contract:  A Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of 
Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1086 (2002) (discussing agreements that 
modify “what evidence may or may not be presented as proof”). 
 21. See Silberman et al., supra note 17, at 1539. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration:  Case 
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2011) (finding that, in 
arbitration, employees have a lower win rate and, when victorious, receive lower awards 
compared to litigation); Alexander J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, The Impact of Case and 
Arbitrator Characteristics on Employment Arbitration Outcomes 25 (June 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent
.cgi?article=1022&context=conference (concluding that arbitration claims arising from an 
employer-promulgated procedure “result in relatively fewer employee wins, lower damages, 
and fewer compromise awards”). 
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This Note focuses on predispute arbitration agreements—agreements in 
which the parties stipulate, generally in a written contract, to resolve some 
or all of their future disputes through arbitration.25  The resulting agreement 
is often called “mandatory” arbitration because, having consented to submit 
future disputes to arbitration, a party can be compelled into arbitration when 
such disputes later arise.26  Predispute arbitration agreements are 
appropriately referred to as “procedural contracts” because they allow 
parties to bargain over procedural rights even before a dispute arises.27  
While in recent decades the Supreme Court has permitted greater freedom 
in the structuring of predispute arbitration agreements,28 this Note focuses 
on the critical limits to enforceable arbitration agreements that still remain. 
B.  Class Action Litigation and Class Arbitration 
The class action is a procedural mechanism that enables one or more 
parties to bring a legal claim on behalf of other similarly situated 
individuals.29  Largely unique to the American legal system,30 the class 
action has been in use since 1966, when Congress promulgated Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).31  A Rule 23 class action has 
the potential for far greater adjudicative efficiency by permitting, for 
example, a million victims, each of whom have been defrauded of $100 
apiece by a common defendant, to bring one $100 million lawsuit rather 
than one million $100 lawsuits.32  Because class actions can allow for the 
aggregation of many similar small value claims, they are considered by 
many to serve an important public role of allowing “those who are less 
powerful to band together . . . to seek redress of grievances that would go 
unremedied if each litigant had to fight alone.”33  Given the high cost of 
bringing a lawsuit, such small value claims would likely never be brought 
 
 25. See Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims:  Has Pre-dispute 
[Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069, 1069 (1998). 
 26. See id. 
 27. Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. 
REV. 1103, 1105–06 (2011). 
 28. See infra Part I.C.3–4. 
 29. See Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 
60 U. KAN. L. REV. 767, 770 (2012). 
 30. See THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 641 (2d ed. 2008) (“[C]lass 
actions remain another instance of ‘American exceptionalism’ in procedure.”). 
 31. See Weston, supra note 29, at 770.  Under Rule 23, a claim can be brought on behalf 
of others only if the claim satisfies requirements of numerosity of members, commonality of 
questions of law or fact, typicality of claims or defense, and adequacy of representation. See 
ROWE ET AL., supra note 30, at 646–50; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).  The class claim must 
also be necessary either to avoid unfairness or serious hardship for the class representative, 
or would be more efficient than individual litigation. See ROWE ET AL., supra note 30, at 650; 
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 32. ROWE ET AL., supra note 30, at 640. 
 33. See Weston, supra note 29, at 770–71 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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on an individual basis and can only practically be brought by way of a class 
action.34 
However, class actions raise concerns.  While a class action case can 
serve as a powerful deterrent to misbehavior, weak claims brought as a 
class action can have the perverse effect of inducing settlement simply due 
to the large amount of money at stake.35  Thus, the class action has 
sometimes been characterized as “legalized blackmail.”36  Furthermore, 
while a class action can increase efficiency by aggregating many claims, it 
can also result in expensive discovery and difficulties in case management 
and trial proceedings.37  Concerns also arise in ensuring that class counsel, 
who often stands to receive a financial award far greater than any individual 
class member, acts in the best interest of all of the class members.38 
Class arbitration imports elements of class actions into the arbitral 
context.39  While class arbitration has existed since the early 1980s, it was 
not in significant use until receiving implicit approval from the Supreme 
Court in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,40 decided in 2003.41  A 
plurality held that, where a predispute arbitration agreement was silent on 
whether classwide procedures could be used, the arbitrator could decide 
whether the parties intended to allow classwide procedures in arbitration or 
court.42  Spotting an open door to class arbitration, professional arbitration 
providers such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and 
JAMS43 soon after began setting up specialized rules for administering 
class arbitrations.44 
The rules promulgated for class arbitration closely resembled judicial 
class actions.  For example, under the Supplementary Rules of the AAA, if 
an arbitrator concludes that a predispute arbitration agreement permits class 
 
 34. See, e.g., Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The 
realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual 
suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”). 
 35. ROWE ET AL., supra note 30, at 640. 
 36. Weston, supra note 29, at 770. 
 37. See ROWE ET AL., supra note 30, at 640. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See Strong, supra note 17, at 205–06. 
 40. 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
 41. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 27, at 1139; Strong, supra note 17, at 206; 
Weston, supra note 29, at 768. 
 42. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452–53; see also Weston, supra note 29, at 768.  To some 
extent, the Supreme Court overruled this holding in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). See infra Part I.C.4. 
 43. The organization was formally called Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, 
Inc., but has since changed its name to JAMS, The Resolution Experts. About the JAMS 
Name, JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com/about-the-jams-name/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 44. Strong, supra note 17, at 206; see also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY 
RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS (effective Oct. 8, 2003) [hereinafter AAA SUPPLEMENTARY 
RULES], available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF;jsessionid=Q38zRMZQvJFBzn295h
3vWxwZDyxRNyqnmT2dlynW2SmlyPCLGRpL!644581746?url=/cs/groups/commercial/
documents/document/dgdf/mda0/~edisp/adrstg_004129.pdf; JAMS, JAMS Class Action 
Procedures (effective May 1, 2009), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/
Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Class_Action_Procedures-2009.pdf. 
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action, he must decide whether class arbitration is appropriate for the case 
by using standards resembling those enumerated in Rule 23.45  If so, the 
arbitrator adjudicates the case on the merits.46 
This Note focuses on the use of class waivers in predispute arbitration 
agreements.  Such agreements require that disputes be resolved in 
arbitration and bar the use of class arbitration, thus effectively precluding 
all forms of class proceedings in the resolution of all future disputes.47  This 
Note argues that class waivers are unenforceable in employment predispute 
arbitration agreements. 
C.  The FAA and the Expanding Scope of 
Enforceable Arbitration Agreements 
The Federal Arbitration Act undergirds the discussion and analysis to 
come.  This section first describes the Act’s inception and structure.  It then 
reviews three legal developments that are essential to understanding the 
present conflict:  the application of the FAA to employment contracts, the 
arbitrability of statutory claims under the FAA, and the interaction between 
the FAA and class waivers. 
1.  The Federal Arbitration Act 
Through the beginning of the twentieth century, courts viewed predispute 
arbitration agreements with a high degree of suspicion, often declaring them 
unenforceable, because they sought to “oust” the court of jurisdiction for 
adjudication of contractual disputes.48  In response, Congress passed the 
Federal Arbitration Act of 192549 to combat “widespread judicial hostility 
to arbitration agreements”50 and establish a “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements.”51  The Supreme Court has written that the FAA’s 
purpose is to put the enforceability of arbitration agreements on equal 
footing with all other contracts.52  Section 2 of the FAA—the “primary 
substantive provision of the Act”53—states in full: 
 
 45. Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 27, at 1140; see also AAA SUPPLEMENTARY 
RULES, supra note 44, R. 4. 
 46. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 44, R. 7. 
 47. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 27, at 1106–07; Weston, supra note 29, at 767 
n.1. 
 48. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 27, at 1112; see also Peter B. Rutledge, 
Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 552–53 (2008). 
 49. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2006)). 
 50. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011). 
 51. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see 
also Weston, supra note 29, at 771 (“The regulatory framework for arbitration in the United 
States is set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925.”). 
 52. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008); see also Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (explaining that the FAA’s “purpose 
was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place 
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts”); Drahozal & Rutledge, 
supra note 27, at 1112. 
 53. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24. 
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A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to 
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to 
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a 
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.54 
This section establishes that agreements to arbitrate dealing with 
commerce and maritime matters are fully enforceable, whether regarding 
present or future disputes.55  If parties agree to resolve future disputes using 
the procedural rules of arbitration rather than the default procedural rules of 
litigation, a court later reviewing the contract must respect and enforce this 
agreement as written.56  The FAA establishes, with discrete and limited 
exceptions, a body of substantive federal law declaring contractual 
agreements to arbitrate, including predispute agreements, “valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable.”57  As detailed below, the scope of this 
mandate has been significantly broadened in recent decades. 
2.  The FAA and Employment Agreements 
In 1991, in Circuit City Stores v. Adams, Inc.,58 the Supreme Court 
addressed whether and to what extent the FAA applied to disputes arising 
under employment contracts.  Section 1 of the FAA excludes from its 
coverage “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any 
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”59  The 
question for the Court was how broadly to read the exempted “class of 
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”—whether it should be 
construed narrowly to exempt only arbitration agreements of workers 
engaged in transportation or broadly to exempt effectively all employment 
arbitration agreements.60 
Employing a thorough textual analysis, the Court held that “the text of 
the FAA forecloses the construction of § 1 . . . which would exclude all 
employment contracts from the FAA.”61  The Court reasoned that the 
residual “class of workers” term must be controlled and defined by 
reference to the enumerated categories of workers that precede it— 
“seamen” and “railroad employees”—and so the exemption can apply only 
 
 54. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 55. See MACNEIL, supra note 17, at 102. 
 56. See Weston, supra note 29, at 772 (“A fundamental principle underlying the FAA is 
to respect freedom of contract.”). 
 57. 9 U.S.C. § 2; see Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (explaining that 
the FAA “‘creates a body of federal substantive law’” (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 
25 n.32)). 
 58. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 59. 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
 60. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109. 
 61. Id. at 119. 
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narrowly to “contracts of employment of transportation workers.”62  Thus, 
the FAA and its “healthy regard”63 for the enforceability of predispute 
arbitration agreements governs the broad swath of employment contracts.64 
3.  The FAA and Arbitrability of Statutory Claims 
Since Congress passed the FAA in 1925, the Supreme Court has reached 
varied conclusions on whether the statute can compel arbitration of disputes 
that are statutory in nature.  In the decades immediately following 
enactment, the scope of the FAA in this area was significantly limited.  
Courts held that many disputes arising under federal statutes, such as 
securities laws, antitrust laws, and civil rights laws, were nonarbitrable 
because arbitration was inconsistent with Congress’s intent in creating a 
cause of action under those statutes.65  This broad “nonarbitrability 
doctrine” persisted for roughly fifty years after the enactment of the FAA.66 
This began to change in the 1980s.67  For example, in the 1985 case 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,68 the Supreme 
Court considered the enforceability of a predispute arbitration agreement 
between Mitsubishi, a Japanese automobile manufacturer, and Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, a Puerto Rican distributor.69  Their agreement 
stipulated that all future disputes, controversies, or differences between the 
parties under their distribution contract would be resolved through 
arbitration in Japan, in accordance with the rules of the Japan Commercial 
Arbitration Association.70  When a dispute over shipments arose, 
Mitsubishi filed suit in federal court in Puerto Rico and moved to compel 
arbitration under the FAA and the terms of the parties’ arbitration 
agreement.71  Soler then counterclaimed, alleging, among other things, 
antitrust violations under the Sherman Antitrust Act.72  The question was 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). 
 64. Justice Stevens, in dissent, accused the majority of “[p]laying ostrich” by ignoring 
the “substantial history” indicating that the exemption language was added to the FAA 
precisely to alleviate concerns by labor unions that the statute might later be interpreted to 
apply to employment contracts. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 126–28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
The proposed Arbitration Fairness Act seeks to amend the FAA and effectively overrule 
Circuit City.  Its most recent incarnation states in relevant part:  “no predispute arbitration 
agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment dispute.” 
S. 987, 112th Cong. § 402 (2011). 
 65. Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 27, at 1112–13; see, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 
427, 438 (1953) (holding that antitrust claims are nonarbitrable). 
 66. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 27, at 1113 (describing how the bifurcation of 
arbitral disputes and nonarbitrable disputes persisted from 1925 until the 1970s and 1980s); 
Rutledge, supra note 48, at 553. 
 67. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 27, at 1113. 
 68. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
 69. Id. at 616–17. 
 70. Id. at 617. 
 71. Id. at 617–19; see also 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). 
 72. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 619–20. 
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whether a statutory claim brought by Soler under the Sherman Act could be 
compelled into arbitration via the FAA.73 
Relying on the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,” 
the Court held that, as a general rule, arbitration agreements must be 
enforced for all claims, including those based on statutory rights.74  As a 
guiding principle, the Court reasoned, Congress’s preeminent concern in 
passing the FAA was “to enforce private agreements into which parties had 
entered,”75 and so agreements to arbitrate must be “rigorously enforce[d]”76 
with “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues . . . resolved in 
favor of arbitration.”77  The Court held that short of Congressional intent 
deriving from text or legislative history to the contrary, statutory claims can 
properly be resolved in arbitration because, “[h]aving made the bargain to 
arbitrate, the party should be held to it.”78 
The Court stressed that compelling the resolution of the claim to 
arbitration in no way conflicted with Soler’s ability to bring antitrust claims 
under the Sherman Act: 
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.  It trades the 
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, 
informality, and expedition of arbitration.79 
Because Soler “effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in 
the arbitral forum,”80 the Court held the arbitration agreement fully 
enforceable.81  Critically, however, congruent with its reasoning the Court 
carved out an essential limitation:  where an arbitration agreement serves as 
a “prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies . . .  
[the Court] would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as 
against public policy.”82 
In 1989, the Court applied similar reasoning in Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc.83 in holding that claims brought under the 
Securities Act of 1933 were arbitrable; again, the change in forum did not 
forfeit any substantive rights of the parties.84  The Court explicitly 
overruled its holding in Wilko v. Swan,85 an earlier case from the “non-
 
 73. Id. at 624–25. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)). 
 76. Id. at 626 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)). 
 77. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–
25 (1983)). 
 78. Id. at 628. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 637. 
 81. Id. at 640. 
 82. Id. at 637 n.19. 
 83. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 84. Id. at 481. 
 85. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
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arbitrability” era.86  However, the Court was careful to note that the 
predispute arbitration agreement in question only interfered with 
“procedural components” of the Securities Act, including broad venue 
provisions in federal courts, nationwide service of process in federal courts, 
removal of amount-in-controversy requirements, and concurrent state and 
federal jurisdiction.87  Other provisions of the Securities Act not in dispute 
are substantive, such as placing the burden on the seller to prove lack of 
scienter when a buyer alleges fraud.88  Waiver is permissible for procedural 
components of the statute, as the Court rejected the “outmoded 
presumption” that arbitration weakens “the protections afforded in the 
substantive law to would-be complainants.”89 
Similarly, in 1991, the Supreme Court considered in Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.90 whether a statutory claim brought in 
federal court under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act91 (ADEA) 
could be compelled into arbitration per the terms of a predispute arbitration 
agreement between Interstate and one of its employees.92  Declaring the 
arbitration agreement enforceable and compelling arbitration, the Court 
reiterated many of its arguments from Mitsubishi.  The Court stated that the 
employee, because he had agreed to arbitrate, had the burden of showing 
congressional intent to preclude waiver of a judicial forum for ADEA 
claims.93  This congressional intent, if it exists, “will be discoverable in the 
text of the ADEA, its legislative history, or an ‘inherent conflict’ between 
arbitration and the ADEA’s underlying purposes.”94  The Court stressed 
that “‘questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for 
the federal policy favoring arbitration.’”95 
Applying this test, the Court failed to find the necessary congressional 
intent or conflict of underlying purpose in the text or legislative history of 
the ADEA.96  Arbitration falls within the “ADEA’s flexible approach to 
resolution of claims”97 and allows parties to broadly select the forum for 
resolving their dispute.98  The Court also rejected arguments that specific 
aspects of arbitration were incompatible with resolution of a suit brought by 
an employee under the ADEA, such as concerns of bias by the arbitration 
 
 86. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 485. 
 87. Id. at 481–82. 
 88. Id. at 481. 
 89. Id. 
 90. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 91. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006). 
 92. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23. 
 93. Id. at 26 (citing Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 
(1987)). 
 94. Id. (quoting Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987)). 
 95. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983)). 
 96. Id. at 35. 
 97. Id. at 29. 
 98. See id. (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477, 483 
(1989)). 
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panel, lack of extensive discovery, absence of written opinions, inequality 
of bargaining power between employee and employer, and—of particular 
importance for this Note—absence of class action relief through arbitration 
procedures.99  On this last point, the Court noted that the arbitrator was not 
restricted in the types of relief he was permitted to award, and applicable 
New York Stock Exchange rules provided for collective proceedings.100  At 
least on these facts, arbitration did not impinge upon class relief or any 
other underlying purpose of the ADEA that would render the parties’ 
predispute arbitration agreement unenforceable.  As in Mitsubishi, the Court 
emphasized that arbitration did not prevent the plaintiff from vindicating his 
underlying age discrimination claim, and so, “‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a 
statutory claim, [the plaintiff] does not forgo the substantive rights afforded 
by the statute.’”101 
Finally, in 2012, the Court in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood102 
considered the specificity of legislative instruction required to overcome the 
presumption of enforceability of an arbitration agreement.  The case dealt 
with a credit card application that stipulated arbitration for resolution of all 
future disputes.103  Customers brought a claim under the Credit Repair 
Organizations Act104 (CROA) for misleading representations made by the 
defendant, a credit card company.105  The customers argued that, because 
the CROA contains a provision stating that “‘[y]ou have a right to sue a 
credit repair organization that violates the Credit Repair Organization 
Act,’”106 they could not be compelled into arbitration despite the terms of 
their predispute arbitration agreement and should have been permitted to 
bring their CROA claim in court.107 
Citing Mitsubishi, the Court reasoned that arbitration agreements must be 
enforced according to their terms, even when the claims at issue are federal 
statutory claims, unless the federal statute overrides the FAA by a “contrary 
congressional command.”108  The Court held that statutory language merely 
suggesting a cause of action (here a “right to sue”) is not a sufficient 
“contrary congressional command” to override the FAA.109  As in 
Mitsubishi, Rodriquez de Quijas, and Gilmer, compelling arbitration does 
not conflict with any substantive statutory rights afforded by the CROA 
because “contractually required arbitration of claims satisfies the statutory 
 
 99. Id. at 30–33. 
 100. Id. at 32. 
 101. Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 
614, 628 (1985)). 
 102. 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). 
 103. Id. at 668. 
 104. 15 U.S.C. § 1679 (2006). 
 105. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 665. 
 106. Id. at 669 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a)). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. (quoting Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)). 
 109. Id. at 670 (quoting Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 
(1987)). 
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prescription of civil liability in court.”110  If Congress wishes to overrule 
the FAA by prohibiting use of arbitration for certain statutory claims, it 
must do so “in a manner less obtuse” than the language of the CROA.111  
The “right to sue” language provides only a “guarantee of the legal power 
to impose liability.”112  Because this right could be effectuated through 
arbitration, the Court enforced the terms of the arbitration agreement. 
4.  The FAA and Class Waivers 
The Supreme Court has also shifted in its interpretation of the 
relationship between the FAA and the use of class arbitration.  The Court’s 
plurality opinion in Bazzle, described above,113 was viewed as a signal that 
arbitrators could use class arbitration when appropriate and, consequently, 
use of class arbitration increased significantly.114  More recently, however, 
the Court has decided two cases that significantly increase the ability of a 
party to avoid use of class proceedings—in both court and arbitration—
through use of class waivers in predispute arbitration agreements.115 
In the 2010 case Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International 
Corp.,116 the Court decided whether imposing class arbitration on parties 
whose arbitration agreement is silent on that issue is consistent with the 
FAA.117  The arbitration agreement in dispute, between shipping companies 
and a corporate customer, required arbitration of all future disputes but was 
silent as to whether this permitted use of class arbitration.118 
The Court began its analysis with “the basic precept that arbitration ‘is a 
matter of consent, not coercion.’”119  Accordingly, the Court must “give 
effect to the contractual rights and expectation of the parties” and ensure 
that “the parties’ intentions control.”120  One area in which the parties must 
consent is “with whom they choose to arbitrate their disputes.”121  Because 
class arbitration would essentially require the defendant to arbitrate with 
many more parties than it explicitly consented, the Court concluded that “a 
 
 110. Id. at 671. 
 111. Id. at 672. 
 112. Id. at 671 (emphasis omitted). 
 113. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 114. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 115. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. 
v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
 116. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
 117. Id. at 1764. 
 118. Id. at 1764–66.  The Court noted initially that its plurality opinion in Bazzle did not 
bear on the present analysis.  The Court rejected the parties’ view that the Bazzle plurality 
stood for the proposition that “an arbitrator, not a court, [should] decide whether a contract 
permits class arbitration.” Id. at 1772.  Rather, the Bazzle plurality determined only that the 
arbitrator could determine whether an arbitration agreement was indeed silent on the issue of 
class arbitration. Id. at 1771.  Thus, the question of whether class arbitration is permitted 
given contractual silence remained unanswered. Id. at 1772. 
 119. Id. at 1773 (quoting Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior 
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)). 
 120. Id. at 1774 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 121. Id. 
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party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration 
unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do 
so.”122 
In the Court’s reasoning, explicit agreement to enter into class arbitration 
is necessary because “class-action arbitration changes the nature of 
arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented 
to it by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator.”123  The 
Court offered two justifications for this conclusion.  First, class arbitration 
diminishes the usual benefits of arbitration—“lower costs, greater 
efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve 
specialized disputes.”124  Second, the shift to class arbitration introduces 
fundamental changes because, as compared to bilateral arbitration, class 
arbitration calls for the resolution of many disputes between hundreds or 
thousands of parties, often sacrifices privacy and confidentiality, binds 
many absent parties, and greatly increases the commercial stakes.125  Class 
arbitration fundamentally differs from bilateral arbitration and, under the 
FAA, cannot be imposed on an unwilling party absent explicit contractual 
consent.126 
In 2011, the Supreme Court addressed for the first time the enforceability 
of contractual class waivers in Concepcion.  A cell phone contract between 
AT&T and a customer required that all future disputes be brought in 
arbitration and in the parties’ “‘individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or 
class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.’”127  
However, under California law, a clause waiving classwide procedures in 
consumer adhesion contracts was unconscionable and thus 
unenforceable.128  The Concepcions argued that this rationale for not 
enforcing the arbitration agreement fell under the “saving clause” of Section 
2 of the FAA, which requires that arbitration agreements be declared 
unenforceable “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”129  If the California law was not included 
within the saving clause, then the FAA would preempt the state law and the 
 
 122. Id. at 1775. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. at 1776. 
 126. See id.  For an article taking to task the Court’s conclusion that class arbitration 
fundamentally changes the nature of arbitration, see Strong, supra note 17 (arguing that class 
arbitration closely resembles other forms of multiparty arbitration). 
 127. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011) (quoting Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari at 61a, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893)). 
 128. Id. at 1746; see also Discover Bank v. Superior Court of L.A., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 
87 (2005) (holding that where a class waiver “is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in 
a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small 
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power 
has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of 
individually small sums of money,” the waiver is unconscionable and thus unenforceable). 
 129. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)). 
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parties’ arbitration agreement waiving use of classwide procedures would 
be enforceable.130 
Relying heavily on Stolt-Nielsen, the Court held that the California law 
stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress” in enacting the FAA, and so was 
preempted by the FAA.131  By entering into an arbitration agreement, 
parties seek to contractually modify the procedural rules that will be used to 
resolve their dispute.132  The Court viewed use of class arbitration rather 
than bilateral arbitration as a modification of procedural rules akin to 
altering the rules of discovery or evidence.133  The California law, by 
forbidding class arbitration waivers in consumer adhesion contracts and 
thus requiring the availability of classwide procedures, interfered with the 
freedom of the parties to select their procedural rules, and so “create[d] a 
scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”134 
As in Stolt-Nielsen, the Court emphasized the significant differences 
between class arbitration and bilateral arbitration.  Class arbitration 
“sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and 
makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate 
procedural morass than final judgment.”135  Even if a state has legitimate 
grounds for requiring class proceedings—such as the ability to “prosecute 
small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through the legal system”136—
a state law, such as the California law, is impermissible.137  By requiring 
procedures beyond the scope of the parties’ consent, the law stands as an 
obstacle to the FAA’s principle purpose of ensuring that private arbitration 
agreements are enforced according to their terms.138  Reading a class 
arbitration requirement into the FAA’s savings clause for consumer 
agreements would be “absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the 
[FAA].”139  Accordingly, the Court overruled the state unconscionability 
law, with language suggesting a broad endorsement of the enforceability of 
class waivers in predispute arbitration agreements.140 
 
 130. See id. at 1747. 
 131. Id. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 132. Id. at 1748–49 (citations omitted) (“[W]e have held that parties may agree . . . to 
arbitrate according to specific rules.”). 
 133. Id. at 1747. 
 134. Id. at 1748. 
 135. Id. at 1751. 
 136. Id. at 1753. 
 137. See id. at 1748. 
 138. See id.  The Court reiterated the point made in Stolt-Nielsen that class arbitration 
cannot be used absent explicit consent from both parties. Id. at 1750–51 (“The conclusion 
follows that class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by [California law] rather than 
consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.”). 
 139. Id. at 1748 (quoting AT&T v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227–28 (1998)). 
 140. See id. at 1753; see also Weston, supra note 29, at 781 (“Concepcion appeared to 
require that courts enforce class action waivers, even under circumstances where the bans on 
collective relief would otherwise impose unconscionable results.”). 
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Putting these developments in FAA jurisprudence together, a few general 
conclusions can be made.  First, the FAA applies to nearly all arbitration 
agreements in employment contracts, with only narrow exceptions for 
transportation workers.141  Second, where parties have entered into a 
predispute arbitration agreement, the FAA compels arbitration of many 
types of statutory claims, provided that arbitration will not infringe upon 
any substantive rights of the parties.142  Third, such claims must be 
arbitrated according to the clear intent of the parties as expressed in their 
arbitration agreement.143  Where the parties have not agreed to the use of 
class arbitration, the arbitrator cannot later implement it absent the parties’ 
consent.144  Class waivers in arbitration agreements are generally 
enforceable, as state law cannot require the availability of class 
arbitration.145  Statutory rights of employees, to be discussed below, should 
be analyzed with this framework in mind. 
D.  The NLRA and the Development of Protected Employee Activities 
The NLRA is a cornerstone piece of federal legislation establishing basic 
rights of employees.  In order to determine how these rights interact with 
the FAA, it is necessary to understand the substantive nature of the NLRA 
and the type of employee activities it protects.  To that end, this section first 
provides background on important elements of the NLRA.  Next, it 
describes the types of employee activities protected by the NLRA as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court and NLRB, and then it reviews a recent 
NLRB decision ruling that an employee’s invocation of classwide 
proceedings is one such activity.  Finally, this section discusses the 
waivability of NLRA protections and the appropriate remedy if the Board 
or a court finds a violation.  
1.  Purpose and Structure of the NLRA 
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935146 sought to strengthen the 
ability of workers to organize in order to better their employment 
 
 141. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 142. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 143. See supra Part I.C.4. 
 144. See supra notes 115–26 and accompanying text. 
 145. See supra notes 127–40 and accompanying text. 
 146. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–
169 (2006)).  Portions of the NLRA were amended in the Labor Management Relations Act 
of 1947 (also known as the Taft-Hartley Act), Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) 
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151), and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 
1959 (also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act), Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) 
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531).  For a historical overview of the development of the 
NLRA, see JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW:  THE BOARD, THE COURTS, 
AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 35–63 (6th ed. 2012). 
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conditions.147  Section 1 of the NLRA makes clear that the primary focus of 
the statute is the right of employees to act collectively148: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States . . . [to protect] 
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, 
and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose 
of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other 
mutual aid or protection.149 
The NLRA gives employees a right to organize and, unlike the National 
Industrial Recovery Act150 (NIRA) passed two years prior, the NLRA 
makes this right legally enforceable.151  The linchpin of the NLRA is 
Section 7, which provides:  “Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection.”152 
Section 7 establishes three rights—the right to organize, the right to 
bargain collectively, and the right to engage in other concerted activities—
that were considered necessary “to establish a balance of bargaining power 
between employer and employee and thereby avoid the pitfalls and 
inadequacies that had characterized earlier labor legislation [such as the 
NIRA].”153  The core purpose of Section 7, as the Supreme Court has 
written, is to “affirmatively guarantee[] employees the most basic rights of 
industrial self-determination.”154  To effectuate this guarantee, Section 8 of 
the NLRA provides:  “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer 
. . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the 
rights guaranteed in section [7].”155  Legally enforceable protection of 
employees’ right to engage in concerted activities is, in the words of the 
Supreme Court, the “fundamental right” protected by the NLRA.156 
To enforce the rights created by Sections 7 and 8, the NLRA established 
a new federal agency called the National Labor Relations Board.157  
Sections 3 through 6 of the NLRA created the Board and set out basic 
details of its composition and operations.158  Section 9 gives the Board 
exclusive jurisdiction over questions of employee representation,159 and 
Section 10 gives the Board exclusive jurisdiction over enforcement of 
 
 147. HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 28. 
 148. Id. at 82. 
 149. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
 150. 15 U.S.C. § 703 (repealed 1935). 
 151. See HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 28. 
 152. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 153. HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 28–29. 
 154. Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 61 (1975). 
 155. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). 
 156. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937). 
 157. See HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 29. 
 158. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153–156. 
 159. See HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 29; see also 29 U.S.C. § 159. 
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Section 8 unfair labor practices.160  Section 10 also sets forth, in broad 
terms, NLRB procedures, including provisions for judicial review and 
enforcement of Board orders.161 
2.  Scope of Section 7 Rights 
Section 7 of the NLRA grants employees the right “to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.”162  
This clause establishes employee protection not just in joining or assisting 
labor organizations but also in engaging in a broad category of activities 
that are carried out for their “mutual aid or protection.”163  To receive 
Section 7 protection, an employee activity must meet two requirements.  
First, the activity must be “concerted”; it must be “undertaken together by 
two or more employees or undertaken by one on behalf of others.”164  
Second, an employee activity must be for “mutual aid or protection.”165  
Reviewing the types of activities encompassed by these terms will aid in 
understanding why the Board properly held recently that they include 
employee use of classwide proceedings. 
a.  “Concerted Activity” 
Courts and the NLRB have endorsed a broad reading of the “concerted” 
requirement of Section 7 activities.  Narrowly, employees act concertedly 
when they engage in direct group action and “have joined together in order 
to achieve common goals.”166  In addition, an individual employee can 
engage in concerted activity in two other circumstances:  “(1) that in which 
the lone employee intends to induce group activity, and (2) that in which 
the employee acts as a representative of at least one other employee.”167  
The Supreme Court has justified this broad reading of Section 7 by 
reasoning that “[t]here is no indication that Congress intended to limit this 
protection to situations in which an employee’s activity and that of his 
fellow employees combine with one another in any particular way.”168 
Applying this standard, an individual employee engages in “concerted 
activity” when he or she protests working hours and travel requirements in 
the presence of other employees,169 engages in conversations for the 
 
 160. See HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 29; see also 29 U.S.C. § 160. 
 161. See HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 29. 
 162. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 163. HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 83. 
 164. Id. at 83–84. 
 165. For a general summary of these two requirements, see Ann C. Hodges, Can 
Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled with Section 7 Rights?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
173, 187–200 (2003); see also HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 209–33. 
 166. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 830 (1984); see also HIGGINS, supra note 
146, at 210–11. 
 167. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 831. 
 168. Id. at 835. 
 169. See Am. Red Cross Blood Servs. Johnstown Region, 322 N.L.R.B. 590, 594 (1996). 
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purpose of initiating group activity,170 composes a petition protesting a pay 
system,171 writes a letter to a newspaper seeking community support for a 
strike,172 or posts notices regarding workplace illness seeking discussion 
with other employees.173  However, activity by an individual is not 
concerted if undertaken solely “by and on behalf of the employee 
himself.”174  Thus, an employee’s refusal to operate equipment that he 
believes is unsafe is not concerted activity where no other employees had 
similarly complained.175 
b.  “Mutual Aid or Protection” 
A comparably generous reading has been given to the “mutual aid or 
protection” requirement.176  Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB177 is the foundational 
Supreme Court case establishing the breadth of activities encompassed by 
this clause. In this case, Eastex, a paper products manufacturer, had barred 
union representatives from distributing to Eastex employees a newsletter 
seeking union membership and support for proposed employment-related 
legislation.178  The union filed a claim with the NLRB, alleging an illegal 
restraint on employees’ right to engage in “concerted activities for the 
purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.”179  The case ultimately proceeded 
to the Supreme Court specifically to address the scope of the “mutual aid or 
protection” clause.180 
The Court ruled that employees act for the purpose of “mutual aid or 
protection” whenever they seek to improve their terms and conditions of 
employment, even if these activities occur outside the immediate employee-
employer relationship.181  Employees’ activities are protected where, as 
here, they seek to appeal to legislators to protect their interests as 
employees, and also whenever employees “seek to improve working 
conditions through resort to administrative and judicial forums.”182  The 
Court held that a narrower reading of the Section 7 protections would 
“‘frustrate the policy of the [NLRA] to protect the right of workers to act 
together to better their working conditions.’”183  While the Court 
 
 170. See Circle K Corp., 305 N.L.R.B. 932 (1991). 
 171. See Globe Sec. Sys., 301 N.L.R.B. 1219, 1221 (1991). 
 172. See Dougherty Lumber Co., 299 N.L.R.B. 295 (1990), enforced, 941 F.2d 1209 (6th 
Cir. 1991). 
 173. See Martin Marietta Corp., 293 N.L.R.B. 719 (1989). 
 174. Meyers Indus., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 885 (1986). 
 175. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 881 (1984). 
 176. See HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 220–27. 
 177. 437 U.S. 556 (1978). 
 178. Id. at 559–61. 
 179. Id. at 558 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006)). 
 180. Id. at 562 (“Because of apparent differences among the Courts of Appeals as to the 
scope of rights protected by the ‘mutual aid or protection’ clause of § 7 . . . we granted 
certiorari.”). 
 181. Id. at 565. 
 182. Id. at 566. 
 183. Id. at 567 (quoting NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962)). 
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acknowledged that some activities may be too attenuated to be covered by 
the “mutual aid or protection” clause, the Court left it to the Board to 
analyze possible borderline cases in the first instance.184 
Accordingly, Section 7 has been interpreted to protect various forms of 
appeals to legislators or agencies and filings of judicial actions.  Employees 
engage in Section 7 protected activity when they write letters to legislators 
opposing changes in immigration law that may affect job security,185 file 
safety complaints with state agencies,186 file employment discrimination 
claims with a state civil rights commission,187 or call the Department of 
Labor regarding changes in lunch policy.188  Similarly, Section 7 covers an 
employee who files a petition in court seeking an injunction against 
employer harassment,189 a group of employees who file an invasion of 
privacy suit against an employer using listening devices,190 an employee 
who joins others in filing a libel suit,191 and employees who file a breach of 
contract lawsuit against their employer.192  In general, such appeals to 
agencies or courts are activities for “mutual aid and protection” so long as 
they are not done out of malice or bad faith,193 even if they are ultimately 
found to be without merit.194 
3.  Class Action As a Protected Section 7 Right 
Recently, in D.R. Horton,195 the Board applied these standards in 
considering whether, by filing a class action disputing the classification of 
him and others as supervisors, an employee engaged in activity protected by 
Section 7.  The case dealt with a claim brought by Michael Cuda, a former 
employee of home building company D.R. Horton.196  D.R. Horton’s 
employment agreement, signed by Cuda as a condition of employment, 
stipulated that all disputes be resolved exclusively in arbitration and that the 
arbitrator “may hear only Employee’s individual claims . . . and does not 
have authority to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action or to 
award relief to a group or class of employees in one arbitration 
proceeding.”197  Cuda filed a claim with the NLRB, alleging that Section 7 
protected his right to invoke class proceedings, and so D.R. Horton violated 
 
 184. Id. at 567–68. 
 185. See Kaiser Eng’rs, 213 N.L.R.B. 752 (1974). 
 186. See Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer Corp., 277 N.L.R.B. 635 (1985). 
 187. See Franklin Iron & Metal Corp., 315 N.L.R.B. 819 (1994), enforced, 83 F.3d 156 
(6th Cir. 1996). 
 188. See Salisbury Hotel, 283 N.L.R.B. 685, 685 (1987). 
 189. See Mohave Elec. Coop. v. NLRB, 206 F.3d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 190. See Health Enters. of Am., 282 N.L.R.B. 214, 215 (1986). 
 191. See Sarkes Tarzian, 149 N.L.R.B. 147 (1964). 
 192. See Trinity Trucking & Materials Corp., 221 N.L.R.B. 364 (1975). 
 193. Id. at 365. 
 194. Garage Mgmt. Corp., 334 N.L.R.B. 940, 940 (2001). 
 195. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274 (Jan. 3, 2012). 
 196. Id. at *1. 
 197. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Section 8 by maintaining an employment contract that required the 
arbitrator to resolve all disputes on an individual basis.198 
Quoting Eastex, the Board first reasoned that Section 7 protects 
employees seeking to improve their working conditions through resort to 
administrative, judicial, and arbitral forums, as all are activities undertaken 
for “mutual aid or protection.”199  The Board had previously held that a suit 
filed by multiple employees is a form of concerted activity, and so it 
concluded that the same classification should apply to claims brought on a 
classwide basis.200  This is true even if the suit is initiated unilaterally, on 
behalf of other employees.201  Allowing an employee to assert a claim 
collectively, the Board wrote, serves the purpose of “mutual aid or 
protection,” and is in line with the underlying purpose of the NLRA as 
“[e]mployees are both more likely to assert their legal rights and also more 
likely to do so effectively if they can do so collectively.”202  Thus, the 
Board held that “an individual who files a class or collective action 
regarding wages, hours or working conditions, whether in court or before an 
arbitrator, seeks to initiate or induce group action and is engaged in conduct 
protected by Section 7.”203  The latter portion of this opinion—whether the 
Section 7 violation rendered D.R. Horton’s arbitration agreement 
unenforceable—is discussed below.204 
4.  Waivability and Enforcement of Section 7 Rights 
Once an employee activity is deemed protected under Section 7, a related 
question is whether the right to engage in the activity can be waived by a 
contractual agreement between employee and employer.  The Supreme 
Court addressed whether employees can waive their protected rights in 
National Licorice Co. v. NLRB.205 
In this case, the employment contract between National Licorice 
Company and its employees required that all employees relinquish “the 
right to strike, the right to demand a closed shop or signed agreement with 
 
 198. Id. at *2. 
 199. Id. (quoting Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565–66 (1978)). 
 200. See id. (citing Salt River Valley Water Users Ass’n, 99 N.L.R.B. 849, 853–54 
(1952); Spandsco Oil & Royalty Co., 42 N.L.R.B. 942, 948–49 (1942)). 
 201. See id. at *3. 
 202. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 203. Id. at *4; see also Hodges, supra note 165, at 229 (“[A] mandatory arbitration 
agreement should be found unlawful if it does not expressly permit the unquestionably 
concerted activities of class action . . . .”).  This right does not guarantee class certification.  
Rather, “it guarantees only employees’ opportunity to pursue without employer coercion, 
restraint or interference such claims of a class or collective nature as may be available to 
them under Federal, State or local law.” D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *12 n.24.  An 
employee must be permitted, for example, to use Rule 23 to seek class certification.  
However, if a judge determines that the Rule 23 requirements are not met, he can then deny 
certification without infringing the Section 7 right. Id. 
 204. See infra Part II.A. 
 205. 309 U.S. 350 (1940). 
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any union.”206  This requirement clearly violated “the employees’ rights to 
organize and bargain collectively guaranteed by §§ 7 and 8 of the 
[NLRA].”207  The question, however, was whether a violation of the NLRA 
was grounds to declare the contract unenforceable.208 
The Court ruled that the Board was empowered to declare the 
employment contracts unenforceable under its Section 10 remedial power 
because “the contracts were the fruits of unfair labor practices, stipulated 
for the renunciation by the employees of rights guaranteed by the [NLRA], 
and were a continuing means of thwarting the policy of the [NLRA].”209  
The rights protected by Sections 7 and 8 are “public right[s] vested in [the 
NLRB] as a public body, charged in the public interest with the duty of 
preventing unfair labor practices.”210  Accordingly, “employers cannot set 
at naught the National Labor Relations Act by inducing their workmen to 
agree not to demand performance of the duties which it imposes.”211 
The Supreme Court in J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB212 addressed a related issue. 
In this case, the employer argued that it did not have to negotiate portions of 
a collective agreement because employees were already covered by lawful 
individual employment contracts.213  Again, the Court held that individual 
employment contracts could not be used as grounds to waive rights 
protected by the NLRA.214  Here, because the collective bargaining process 
was mandated by the NLRA, access to it could not be waived in individual 
employment contracts, even if an individual employee received some 
benefits by bargaining individually.215  As in National Licorice, the Court 
emphasized the critical nature of the NLRA as a public law protecting 
public rights.216  Thus, “[w]herever private contracts conflict with [the 
NLRA’s] functions, they obviously must yield or the [NLRA] would be 
reduced to a futility.”217 
Subsequently, the Board has ordered employers to cease and desist from 
maintaining employment agreements that explicitly restrict Section 7 
activity or have the effect of chilling Section 7 activity.218  Furthermore, the 
 
 206. Id. at 355. 
 207. Id. at 360. 
 208. See id. at 351. 
 209. Id. at 361. 
 210. Id. at 364. 
 211. Id. 
 212. 321 U.S. 332 (1944). 
 213. See id. at 334. 
 214. Id. at 339. 
 215. See id. at 336. 
 216. Id. at 337 (citing Nat’l Licorice Co., 309 U.S. at 364). 
 217. Id. 
 218. See Martin Luther Mem’l Home, 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 646–47 (2004) (citations 
omitted) (“[O]ur inquiry into whether the maintenance of a challenged rule is unlawful 
begins with the issue of whether the rule explicitly restricts activities protected by Section 7.  
If it does, we will find the rule unlawful.  If the rule does not explicitly restrict activity 
protected by Section 7, the violation is dependent upon a showing of one of the following:  
(1) employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the 
rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict 
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Supreme Court has held that courts cannot enforce contracts that violate the 
NLRA because they are illegal agreements.219  While the NLRB has 
primary jurisdiction to determine if an agreement violates Sections 7 and 8, 
federal courts must at all times refuse to enforce contracts if they are found 
to violate federal law.220 
II.  RECONCILING THE FAA AND NLRA:  THE ENFORCEABILITY OF CLASS 
WAIVERS IN EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
The issue to be analyzed in the balance of this Note is whether, given the 
Board’s ruling in D.R. Horton that invoking classwide procedures is a form 
of concerted activity protected under Section 7 of the NLRA,221 employers 
can require, as a condition of employment, an agreement to arbitrate all 
future disputes on an individual basis.  The stakes are high.  A recent paper 
found that the prevalence of predispute arbitration agreements in 
employment contracts has increased markedly in recent decades, paralleling 
increased judicial acceptance.222  Studies conducted in the early to mid-
1990s found that between 2.1 percent and 9.9 percent of employers had 
adopted arbitration agreements; by the late 1990s and 2000s the reported 
range increased to between 14.1 percent and 22.7 percent.223  Arbitration 
agreements have been estimated to cover at least thirty million employees, 
and commentators believe this number will continue to rise.224  
Furthermore, in light of Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion, there is concern that 
employers can have a sort of “get out of jail free” card by including class 
waivers as part of arbitration agreements,225 or even simply by leaving the 
arbitration agreement silent as to the use of class proceedings.226 
 
the exercise of Section 7 rights.”); Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998) 
(“Where the rules are likely to have a chilling effect on Section 7 rights, the Board may 
conclude that their maintenance is an unfair labor practice, even absent evidence of 
enforcement.”). 
 219. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 86 (1982) (“While only the Board 
may provide affirmative remedies for unfair labor practices, a court may not enforce a 
contract provision which violates § 8(e) [of the NLRA].”). 
 220. See id. at 83–84 (“‘The power of the federal courts to enforce the terms of private 
agreements is at all times exercised subject to the restrictions and limitations of the public 
policy of the United States as manifested in . . . federal statutes. . . .  Where the enforcement 
of private agreements would be violative of that policy, it is the obligation of courts to 
refrain from such exertions of judicial power.’” (quoting Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34–35 
(1948))). 
 221. See supra Part I.D.3. 
 222. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration:  Clarity 
Amidst the Sound and Fury, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 411 (2007); see also 
Rutledge, supra note 48, at 555 (“Surveys similarly show that . . . a growing number of 
employers and companies are using arbitration clauses.”); Weston, supra note 29, at 772 
(“Arbitration provisions became standard in employment contracts after . . . Gilmer.”). 
 223. See Colvin, supra note 222, at 408–10. 
 224. Ruan, supra note 7, at 22. 
 225. See Weston, supra note 29, at 770, 776; see also Theodore Eisenberg et al., 
Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers:  An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and 
Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 895 (2008) (concluding that 
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While the potential conflict between Section 7 NLRA rights and the FAA 
has been considered in academic literature,227 the NLRB first squarely 
addressed the issue only recently in the latter portion of its D.R. Horton 
opinion.228  In addition to holding that classwide proceedings are a form of 
concerted activity protected by Section 7, the Board also held that D.R. 
Horton’s arbitration agreement interfered with the employee’s Section 7 
right and ordered D.R. Horton to modify its arbitration agreement.229  The 
Board ruled that refusing to enforce the arbitration agreement’s class waiver 
did not create a conflict with the FAA230 and, even if it did, that the FAA 
must yield to the NLRA.231 
Subsequent to the Board’s ruling in D.R. Horton, courts throughout the 
country have ruled on the same issue of employment arbitration agreements 
containing class waivers.  While one federal court agreed with the Board’s 
analysis and declared an arbitration class waiver unenforceable,232 many 
other courts have declined to follow the Board’s reasoning and have 
enforced class waivers.233  This part lays out the arguments made by both 
sides of the debate to establish a clearer picture of the conflict as it currently 
stands.  Part II.A presents in greater detail the Board’s rationale in D.R. 
Horton and the federal court that followed its holding.  Part II.B explores 
the opinions rejecting D.R. Horton and holding class waivers enforceable. 
A.  The NLRB and a Federal Court Refuse To Enforce Class Waivers 
After concluding that pursuit of classwide employment-related claims is 
a protected Section 7 activity,234 the Board in D.R. Horton made two 
further rulings.  First, D.R. Horton’s employment agreement violated 
Section 8 of NLRA by “‘interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing], or coerc[ing] 
 
arbitration clauses are often used in consumer contracts to preclude aggregate consumer 
action, not to promote fairness and efficiency). 
 226. See Terry F. Moritz & Brandon J. Fitch, The Future of Consumer Arbitration in 
Light of Stolt-Nielsen, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 265, 270 (2011) (stating that after Stolt-
Nielsen, “[a] court cannot compel class arbitration without a contractual basis for concluding 
that the parties agreed to it; and presumably no potential defendant would agree to it”). 
 227. See, e.g., Hodges, supra note 165; Kenneth T. Lopatka, A Critical Perspective on the 
Interplay Between Our Federal Labor and Arbitration Laws, 63 S.C. L. REV. 43 (2011); 
John B. O’Keefe, Note, Preserving Collective-Action Rights in Employment Arbitration, 91 
VA. L. REV. 823 (2005). 
 228. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *4 (Jan. 3, 2012). 
 229. Id. at *17–18. 
 230. Id. at *10–15. 
 231. Id. at *16. 
 232. See Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., No. 11-cv-779-bbc, 2012 WL 1242318 
(W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2012).  
 233. See Delock v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., No. 4:11-cv-520-DPM, 2012 WL 
3150391 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 1, 2012); Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038 
(N.D. Cal. 2012); Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, 870 F. Supp. 2d 831 (N.D. Cal. 
2012); Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc., 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198 (Ct. App. 2012); 
Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372 (Ct. App. 2012), appeal docketed, 
147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324 (Cal. Sept. 19, 2012). 
 234. See supra Part I.D.3. 
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employees in the exercise of a right guaranteed’” by Section 7.235  Citing 
National Licorice236 and J.I. Case,237 the Board held it unlawful for D.R. 
Horton to include a term in its employment agreement that restricted a 
Section 7 right by requiring employees to pursue claims against their 
employer only individually.238 
Second, the Board addressed the more critical question:  is this ruling 
consistent with the FAA, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Concepcion?  The Board held that it was and provided four justifications.  
First, the Board reasoned that declaring D.R. Horton’s employment 
agreement unlawful does not conflict with the FAA and its underlying 
concern about judicial or administrative bodies failing to put private 
arbitration agreements “‘upon the same footing as other contracts.’”239  
Under J.I. Case, any private contract that conflicts with the NLRA is 
unlawful, so invalidation of D.R. Horton’s arbitration agreement treats it no 
worse than any other private contract that infringes upon a protected 
activity.240  Unlike in Concepcion, invalidation of the class waiver does not 
rest on “‘defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning 
from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.’”241 
Second, the Board concluded that its ruling does not conflict with the 
FAA, because D.R. Horton’s arbitration agreement waives employees’ 
substantive Section 7 right.242  The FAA does not compel enforcement of 
an arbitration agreement that requires a party to “‘forgo the substantive 
rights afforded by the statute.’”243  Indeed, the Board determined, “the 
intent of the FAA was to leave substantive rights undisturbed.”244  The 
Board wrote that the Section 7 right to bring a class or collective action is 
substantive, not procedural, because “[t]he right to engage in collective 
action—including collective legal action—is the core substantive right 
protected by the NLRA and is the foundation on which the Act and Federal 
labor policy rest.”245  While the Board acknowledged that class action rules 
such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 are procedural, “the Section 7 
right to act concertedly by invoking Rule 23, Section 216(b) [of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA)],246 or other legal procedures is not.”247 
 
 235. D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *5 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006)). 
 236. See supra notes 205–11 and accompanying text. 
 237. See supra notes 212–17 and accompanying text. 
 238. D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *5; see also supra Part I.D.4. 
 239. D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *11 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)); see supra notes 90–101 and accompanying text. 
 240. D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *11. 
 241. Id. at *11 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 
(2011)). 
 242. Id. at *12. 
 243. Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)). 
 244. Id. at *13. 
 245. Id. at *12. 
 246. Section 216(b) of the FLSA creates a procedural mechanism similar to that of a Rule 
23 class action for enforcement of violations:  “An action to recover . . . may be maintained 
against any employer . . . by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or 
themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). 
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Third, the Board reasoned that prohibiting class waivers as violative of 
the NLRA is consistent with the FAA because it falls under the FAA’s 
Section 2 saving clause; arbitration agreements are properly invalidated if 
based on “‘grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.’”248  Here, enforcing an arbitration agreement that violates federal 
employment law is against public policy—precisely the type of grounds 
contemplated by the FAA for declaring an arbitration agreement 
unenforceable under the saving clause.249 
Fourth, even if declaring the agreement unenforceable does conflict with 
the FAA, the Board determined that the FAA must yield to the NLRA.250  
The Board cited the Norris-LaGuardia Act,251 which provides that a private 
agreement is unenforceable if it seeks to prohibit a “‘lawful means [of] 
aiding any person participating or interested in’ a lawsuit arising out of a 
labor dispute.”252  The Norris-LaGuardia Act repealed “‘[a]ll acts and parts 
of acts in conflict.’”253  Because it was passed seven years after the FAA, 
the Board reasoned that the Norris-LaGuardia Act repealed the FAA to the 
extent that it required the enforcement of arbitration agreements with class 
waivers.254 
For all of these reasons, the Board ordered D.R. Horton to cease and 
desist from maintaining its employment agreement because it required 
employees, as a condition of their employment,255 to waive the right to 
maintain class or collective actions in all forums.256 
 
 247. D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *12. 
 248. Id. at *11 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)). 
 249. See id. at *14. 
 250. Id. at *16. 
 251. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115. 
 252. D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *16 (alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. 
§ 104(d)). 
 253. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 115). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at *17–18.  An NLRB Administrative Law Judge has subsequently applied D.R. 
Horton in holding that an employer violates Section 8 even where a class waiver can be 
opted out of, and so it is not a mandatory condition of employment. See 24 Hour Fitness 
USA, Inc., no. 20-CA-035419, 2012 WL 5495007 (NLRB Nov. 6, 2012) (“The requirement 
that employees must affirmatively act to preserve rights already protected by Section 7 rights 
through the opt-out process is . . . an unlawful burden on the right of employees to engage in 
collective litigation that may arise in the future.”). 
 256. The Board made clear that D.R. Horton’s arbitration agreement was illegal because 
it violated the NLRA, not because it violated the FLSA upon which Cuda’s claim of 
misclassification was based. D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *12 (“[T]he right allegedly 
violated by [D.R. Horton’s arbitration agreement] is not the right to be paid the minimum 
wage or overtime under the FLSA, but the right to engage in collective action under the 
NLRA.”).  Nonetheless, some courts rejecting D.R. Horton have incorrectly focused on the 
rights protected by the FLSA rather than the NLRA. See Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 
F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[G]iven the absence of 
any contrary congressional command from the FLSA that a right to engage in class actions 
overrides the mandate of the FAA in favor of arbitration, we reject Owen’s invitation to 
follow the NLRB’s rationale in D.R. Horton.”); Cohen v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 12 Civ. 
2147 (BSJ)(JLC), 2012 WL 6041634, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2012) (citations omitted) (“To 
the extent that Plaintiffs rely on . . . D.R. Horton . . . for the proposition that ‘a waiver of the 
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Several months later, in Herrington v. Waterstone Mortgage Corp.,257 a 
federal court in Wisconsin applied D.R. Horton in refusing to enforce a 
class waiver in an employment arbitration agreement. Plaintiff Pamela 
Herrington brought a claim against her employer for failing to provide 
overtime pay as required under the FLSA.258  The defendant moved to 
dismiss or stay the case under the terms of the parties’ arbitration 
agreement, which required all employment disputes be resolved in 
arbitration, and “[s]uch arbitration may not be joined with or join or include 
any claims by any persons not party to this Agreement.”259  Herrington 
argued that, consistent with D.R. Horton, the arbitration agreement was 
unenforceable because it required her to give up her right under the NLRA 
to pursue a classwide claim.260 
The court first noted that, under Supreme Court precedent, rulings by the 
Board are entitled to “the greatest deference” and should be followed if 
“reasonably defensible.”261  The court then followed the Board’s 
interpretation of the NLRA that collective actions are protected Section 7 
activities.262  The court agreed with the Board that the NLRA provides a 
substantive right that cannot be waived as a condition of employment.263  
Thus, refusing to enforce the class waiver does not conflict with Gilmer, 
which does not mandate enforcement of an agreement that requires waiver 
of substantive rights,264 or Concepcion, which is distinguishable because it 
did not deal with a substantive right protected by a federal statute.265  The 
court found the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA in D.R. Horton 
“reasonably defensible” and invalidated the class waiver in the arbitration 
agreement.266 
 
right to proceed collectively under the FLSA is unenforceable as a matter of law,’ this Court 
. . . declines to follow these decisions.”). 
 257. No. 11-cv-779-bbc, 2012 WL 1242318 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2012). 
 258. Id. at *1. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at *2. 
 261. Id. at *5 (quoting ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994); Sure-
Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984)). 
 262. Herrington, 2012 WL 1242318, at *5 (“Particularly because defendant develops no 
argument that the Board has interpreted the NLRA incorrectly, I see no reason to question 
the Board’s judgment in this instance.”). 
 263. Id. at *4. 
 264. See id. 
 265. See id. at *6. 
 266. Id. (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984)).  The court severed 
the class waiver and stayed the case pending arbitration, primarily because neither party had 
argued that class arbitration was improper for the resolution of the dispute. See id. at *7.  
Very recently, a second federal court refused to enforce a class waiver based on a similar 
substantive right rationale. Brown v. Citicorp Serv., Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00062-BLW, 2013 
WL 645942, at *3 (D. Idaho Feb. 21, 2013) (revoking an employment arbitration agreement 
by reasoning that the employer’s “arbitration agreement does more than merely waive [the 
plaintiff’s] right to a procedural remedy; it bars her from asserting a substantive right that is 
critical to national labor policy”). 
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B.  Federal and State Courts Enforce Class Waivers 
Federal district courts in California267 and Arkansas268 and state courts of 
appeal in California269 have recently enforced class waivers in employment 
arbitration agreements.270  This section first provides a brief account of the 
facts in each of these cases and then explores the overlapping reasoning of 
these courts for enforcing class waivers and refusing to follow D.R. Horton. 
In Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc.,271 Janelle Jasso brought a class 
action in state court against her employer for violations of California labor 
law relating to overtime pay, meal and rest breaks, reimbursement for 
employment-related expenses, and penalties for late wage payments.272  
Jasso had previously signed a predispute arbitration agreement that 
contained a class waiver.273  Money Mart Express removed the case to 
federal court and then moved to compel arbitration according to the terms 
of their arbitration agreement.274  Rejecting D.R. Horton, the court held the 
arbitration agreement and class waiver enforceable and stayed the case 
pending arbitration.275 
In Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc.,276 Zachary Morvant and 
Jean Andrews, former employees of a P.F. Chang’s restaurant, brought a 
class action in state court against P.F. Chang’s for violating California labor 
law by failing to provide meal and rest breaks, refusing to pay for missed 
meal and rest breaks, failing to pay for overtime, and failing to provide 
accurate wage statements.277  P.F. Chang’s removed the case to federal 
 
 267. See Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2012); 
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3150391 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 1, 2012). 
 269. See Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198 (Ct. App. 2012); 
Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372 (Ct. App. 2012), appeal docketed, 
147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324 (Cal. Sept. 19, 2012). 
 270. While this section discusses only these five opinions, numerous other courts have 
declined to follow D.R. Horton, often with reference to the opinions discussed here. See, 
e.g., Long v. BDP Intern., Inc., No. H-12-1446, 2013 WL 245002, at *14 n.11 (S.D. Tex. 
Jan. 22, 2013) (“Horton has been widely criticized and not followed by various of district 
courts.”); Tenet HealthSystem Phila., Inc. v. Rooney, No. 12-mc-58, 2012 WL 3550496, at 
*4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2012) (declining to follow D.R. Horton in part because many district 
courts “have declined to adopt its rationale altogether in the face of conflicting Supreme 
Court precedent, statutory schemes, and questions over its precedential value”); Spears v. 
Mid-America Waffles, Inc., No. 11-2273-CM, 2012 WL 2568157, at *2 (D. Kan. July 2, 
2012) (finding that D.R. Horton is contrary to Concepcion); Outland v. Macy’s Dep’t Stores, 
Inc., No. A133589, 2013 WL 164419, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2013) (discussing the 
federal district courts that have rejected D.R. Horton); Papudesi v. Northrop Grumman 
Corp., No. B235730, 2012 WL 5987550, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2012) (stating that the 
NLRA does not contain a congressional command to override the FAA). 
 271. 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 272. Id. at 1040. 
 273. Id. at 1041. 
 274. Id. at 1040. 
 275. Id. at 1052. 
 276. 870 F. Supp. 2d 831 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 277. Id. at 834. 
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court and moved to compel arbitration per the terms of its arbitration 
agreement, which contained a class waiver.278  The court denied P.F. 
Chang’s motion to compel arbitration as to Morvant because he had never 
signed the arbitration agreement.279  However, the court granted the motion 
to compel arbitration as to Andrews,280 rejecting Andrews’s argument that 
D.R. Horton rendered the arbitration agreement unenforceable.281 
In Delock v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.,282 David Delock and 
several others brought a class action in federal court against their employer 
Securitas Security Services.283  Delock was a site supervisor and his 
coplaintiffs were security guards.284  They alleged that Securitas violated 
the FLSA and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act by forcing them to work 
off the clock.285  Securitas moved to stay the case pending arbitration, 
arguing that the employees had agreed to an enforceable arbitration 
agreement with a class waiver.286  In an initial order, the court held that the 
employees had accepted the arbitration agreement and granted Securitas’s 
motion to compel arbitration.287  However, the court wrote that it needed 
more time to determine if the class waiver was enforceable in light of D.R. 
Horton.288  In a later order, the court considered and rejected D.R. Horton 
and enforced the class waiver.289 
In Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles LLC,290 plaintiff Arshavir 
Iskanian, a driver employed by CLS Transportation, brought a class action 
in state court against CLS, alleging violation of California law for failure to 
pay overtime, provide meal and rest breaks, reimburse business expenses, 
provide accurate and complete wage statements, and pay final wages in a 
timely manner.291  He had previously signed CLS’s arbitration agreement 
containing a class waiver.292  The trial court found in favor of CLS and 
 
 278. Id. at 835. 
 279. Id. at 836–37. 
 280. The parties agreed that Andrews had accepted P.F. Chang’s arbitration agreement. 
Id. at 837. 
 281. Id. at 845 (“[T]he inclusion of a class action waiver provides no basis to hold the 
Arbitration Agreement unenforceable . . . .”). 
 282. No. 4:11-CV-520-DPM, 2012 WL 1066378 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 29, 2012). 
 283. Id. at *1. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at *3. 
 288. Id. at *4. 
 289. Delock v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-520-DPM, 2012 WL 
3150391, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 1, 2012) (“The Court declines to endorse, however, the 
Board’s application of the Federal Arbitration Act or its reading of the precedent applying 
that Act.”). 
 290. 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372 (Ct. App. 2012), appeal docketed, No. S204032 (Cal. Sept. 19, 
2012). 
 291. Id. at 375–76. 
 292. Id. 
 2013] A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT TO CLASS PROCEEDINGS 2975 
granted the motion to compel arbitration.293  The court of appeal affirmed 
the ruling.294 
Finally, in Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc.,295 Lorena Nelsen, 
a former property manager for Legacy Partners Residential, brought a class 
action against Legacy, alleging violations of the California Labor Code.296  
Nelsen had previously accepted an arbitration agreement with a class 
waiver, and Legacy moved to compel arbitration.297  The trial court granted 
Legacy’s motion and ordered individual arbitration,298 and the court of 
appeal affirmed.299 
All of these courts enforced employment arbitration agreements with 
class waivers, and each explicitly rejected D.R. Horton.  Similar and 
overlapping reasoning was used throughout.  These courts largely accepted 
the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA that use of class proceedings is 
protected under Section 7, and therefore their inclusion in arbitration 
agreements violates the NLRA.300  The primary point of contention, rather, 
was whether enforcing the NLRA here conflicts with the FAA and, if so, 
how to resolve the conflict.  To answer this question, several courts noted 
that a decision by the Board interpreting a statute other than the NLRA 
(here the FAA) is not entitled to judicial deference or the “reasonably 
defensible”301 standard applied in Herrington.302  Particularly because the 
NLRB has “no special competence or experience in interpreting the Federal 
Arbitration Act,” the analysis is more searching and critical than that 
undertaken in the case of the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA.303 
Under this standard of review, these courts all held that refusing to 
enforce a class waiver that violates Section 7 creates a conflict with the 
FAA.  The primary justification was that the presumed remedy—
compelling class arbitration absent the parties’ consent—conflicts with the 
underlying purpose of the FAA to enforce arbitration agreements as 
written.304  The focus is on “the broad language in Concepcion which 
 
 293. Id. at 376. 
 294. Id. at 388. 
 295. 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198 (Ct. App. 2012). 
 296. Id. at 202–03. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at 215–16. 
 299. Id. at 216. 
 300. See Delock v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-520-DPM, 2012 WL 
3150391, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 1, 2012) (“This conclusion is a reasonable reading of the 
statute.”); Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(citing J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944); National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 
309 U.S. 350, 360, 364 (1940)); Iskanian, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 381. But see Nelsen, 144 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 213 (“The Board’s decision reflects a novel interpretation of section 7 and the 
FAA.”). 
 301. See supra note 261 and accompanying text. 
 302. See Delock, 2012 WL 3150391, at *3; Nelsen, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 213; Iskanian, 
142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 381–82. 
 303. See DeLock, 2012 WL 3150391, at *3. 
 304. See id. at *2; Jasso, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1048; Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, 
Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831, 842 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Iskanian, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 380. 
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articulates a strong policy choice in favor of enforcing arbitration 
agreements and thereupon holds that class waiver provisions should not be 
stricken or render the agreements unenforceable.”305  Under both Stolt-
Nielsen and Concepcion, class arbitration cannot be compelled absent clear 
intent.306 
Because they found a conflict between the NLRA and the FAA, these 
courts applied CompuCredit’s “contrary congressional command” test to 
determine if the NLRA should overrule the FAA.307  Because the NLRA 
does not contain a command in its text or legislative history requiring the 
availability of classwide claims, class waivers in employment arbitration 
agreements must be enforced in accordance with the FAA.308  Even if there 
is a right under the NLRA to classwide proceedings, it gives way to the 
FAA when waived in an arbitration agreement. 
Courts also rejected D.R. Horton’s conclusion that the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act overrides the FAA’s mandate to enforce illegal arbitration 
agreements.309  As with the FAA, the Board’s interpretation of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act is not entitled to judicial deference, because the Board is 
interpreting a statute other than the NLRA.310  The Norris-LaGuardia Act is 
inapplicable to the enforceability of class waivers, these courts reasoned, 
because it applies only to infringements on joining or withdrawing from 
labor organizations.311  Even if it was applicable, courts concluded that the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act, like the NLRA, contains no CompuCredit “contrary 
congressional command” overriding the FAA.312  Finally, D.R. Horton’s 
implied repeal claim—that the Norris-LaGuardia Act overrules the FAA 
because it was enacted later—also fails because “[t]hough Congress first 
enacted the FAA in 1925, it reenacted the statute in 1947—after passing the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act and reenacting the NLRA.”313  Accordingly, courts 
held that the Board erred in “concluding that the FAA had to give way 
 
 305. Jasso, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1048. 
 306. See Morvant, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 842. 
 307. See Delock, 2012 WL 3150391, at *5; Jasso, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1045–46; Morvant, 
870 F. Supp. 2d at 845; Nelsen, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 214; Iskanian, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 382; 
see also supra notes 102–12 and accompanying text.  CompuCredit was decided after D.R. 
Horton and so was not discussed in the Board’s opinion. 
 308. See Delock, 2012 WL 3150391, at *5 (“The NLRA’s text contains no command that 
is contrary to enforcing the FAA’s mandate.”); Jasso, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1047; Morvant, 870 
F. Supp. 2d at 845 (“Because Congress did not expressly provide that it was overriding any 
provision in the FAA when it enacted the NLRA . . . the Court cannot read such a provision 
into [the NLRA].”); Nelsen, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 214  (“[T]here is no language in the NLRA 
. . . demonstrating that Congress intended the employee concerted action rights therein to 
override the mandate of the FAA.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Iskanian, 142 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 382 (“The D.R. Horton decision identified no ‘congressional command’ in the 
NLRA prohibiting enforcement of an arbitration agreement pursuant to its terms.”). 
 309. See Delock, 2012 WL 3150391, at *5–6; Jasso, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1047; Morvant, 
870 F. Supp. 2d at 843–44. 
 310. See Morvant, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 843. 
 311. Id. at 843–44 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 103(a)–(b) (2006)). 
 312. See Jasso, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1049; Morvant, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 843. 
 313. Delock, 2012 WL 3150391, at *5. 
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because of when Congress had enacted [the NLRA and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act].”314 
III.  THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT SOLUTION 
As detailed in Part II, the NLRB and courts have split on whether to 
enforce class waivers in employment arbitration agreements.  Courts that 
enforced class waivers focused primarily on the policy, articulated in 
Concepcion, of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms in 
the absence of a contrary congressional command in the NLRA, as required 
by CompuCredit, to overcome this policy.315  This part argues that this 
application of Concepcion and CompuCredit fails to consider a critical 
distinguishing feature of Section 7 rights.  While the plaintiffs in 
Concepcion sought class proceedings as a procedural right, class 
proceedings are protected by the NLRA as a substantive right.  The 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA has never mandated the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements that interfere with substantive rights.  
While the Board discussed this point in D.R. Horton, its justification was 
lacking.316  Those courts critical of D.R. Horton failed to address this 
argument. 
This part fills the void left by the NLRB and courts by providing a more 
thorough analysis of the distinction between substantive and procedural 
rights.  The Supreme Court has rich precedent distinguishing between 
substantive and procedural rules for purposes of choice of law in federal 
courts.  Because similar concerns are implicated in rights that arise in 
choice of law as in rights that relate to the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements, understanding how the line between substance and procedure is 
drawn in the former can aid in determining how to properly draw the line in 
the latter. 
Part III.A reviews the distinction between substantive and procedural 
rules for determining choice of law in federal courts.  Part III.B explores 
how courts use similar considerations in determining whether or not to 
enforce aspects of arbitration agreements.  Part III.C applies this framework 
to the right under the NLRA to invoke classwide proceedings and concludes 
that this right is a substantive right.  Because the right is substantive, it 
cannot be waived in an employment arbitration agreement, a conclusion in 
full accord with the Court’s FAA jurisprudence. 
 
 314. Id. 
 315. See supra Part II.B. 
 316. See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *5, *12 (Jan. 3, 
2012) (reasoning that the D.R. Horton’s arbitration agreement “clearly and expressly bars 
employees from exercising substantive rights that have long been held protected by Section 
7 of the NLRA” and rejecting the claim that “the Section 7 right to bring a class or collective 
action is merely ‘procedural’”). 
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A.  The Substance/Procedure Dichotomy for Choice of Law 
When a federal court serves as the forum for the adjudication of state law 
claims by exercising its diversity jurisdiction,317 the court must determine 
whether to apply state or federal law.  The Erie doctrine answers this 
question.318  In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,319 the question for the 
Supreme Court was whether, in determining the duty of care owed by a 
railroad company to a pedestrian walking alongside the track, a federal 
court adjudicating the claim was required to apply Pennsylvania tort law.320  
The Court held that, where no constitutional provision or federal statute 
applied, the federal court must apply relevant Pennsylvania tort law rather 
than general federal common law.321  When sitting in diversity jurisdiction 
the federal courts must apply the substantive law of the relevant state,322 as 
mandated both by the Rules of Decision Act323 and by the Constitution 
itself.324 
The Supreme Court soon acknowledged the difficulty in determining 
whether a state law is “substantive,” and thus must be applied in federal 
court.  In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,325 the question was whether a state 
statute of limitations that had run barred a federal court from adjudicating 
the underlying claim.326  In other words, is a statute of limitations a 
“substantive” or “procedural” rule?327  The Court’s answer was not based 
on whether the state law is “deemed a matter of ‘procedure’ in some 
sense.”328  Rather, a law is procedural if it “concerns merely the manner 
and the means by which a right to recover . . . is enforced,” and substantive 
if it would “significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to 
disregard [the state law].”329  Because the state statute of limitations is 
 
 317. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . 
between Citizens of different States.”). 
 318. For a more detailed account of the Erie doctrine and its underlying rationales, see 
Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove:  Further Reflections on the Erie Doctrine 
From a Conflicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 939, 941–49 (2011). 
 319. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 320. Id. at 69–70.  The claim was brought in federal court for the Southern District of 
New York.  However, because the accident in dispute occurred in Pennsylvania, its tort law 
would govern if any state law governed at all. 
 321. Id. at 80. 
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 325. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 326. Id. at 109. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
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“outcome determinative” in the sense that it would completely bar recovery 
had the suit been brought in state court, it is deemed a substantive state rule 
that must be applied by the federal court.330  Thus, the plaintiff’s claim was 
barred in federal court by the application of the state statute of 
limitations.331 
The distinction between “substantive” and “procedural” rules is also 
implicated when a federal court must determine whether to apply a state law 
that appears to clash with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.  Under the 
Rules Enabling Act332 (REA), the Supreme Court is empowered to 
prescribe “general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for 
cases in the United States district courts . . . and courts of appeals,” on the 
condition that “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.”333  As the Court stated in Hanna v. Plumer,334 the broad 
command of the Erie doctrine is identical to that of the REA:  “[F]ederal 
courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.”335  A 
rule is valid under the REA only if it is “procedural” and, if so, it trumps 
any conflicting state procedural rules in federal court. 
To determine whether a rule is procedural, the Hanna Court provided a 
refined account of the somewhat simplistic Guaranty Trust “outcome 
determinative” test:  “The test must be whether a rule really regulates 
procedure, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by 
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for 
disregard or infraction of them.”336  Applying this test, the Court held that 
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which prescribes the proper 
manner of service of summons, is procedural because it relates only to the 
“practice and procedure of the district courts.”337  The rule was not 
substantive even though the Court acknowledged that the ways in which it 
differs from state rules may in some cases be outcome determinative.338 
Recently in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate 
Insurance Co.,339 the Supreme Court affirmed in a plurality opinion that the 
dividing line between “substance” and “procedure” when analyzing a 
Federal Rule (and thus the validity of the rule itself) is whether the rule 
“really regulate[s] procedure.”340  For the plurality, “[t]he test is not 
whether the rule affects a litigant’s substantive rights; most procedural rules 
 
 330. Id. at 110. 
 331. Id. at 112. 
 332. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
 333. Id. 
 334. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 335. Id. at 465. 
 336. Id. at 464 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 337. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 338. Id. at 468. 
 339. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
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do.”341  Rather, the distinction is based on what the rule itself regulates:  
procedural rules valid under the REA govern only “the manner and the 
means by which the litigants’ rights are enforced”; substantive rules invalid 
under the REA alter “‘the rules of decision by which [the] court will 
adjudicate [those] rights.’”342  Substantive rules “alter the rights 
themselves, the available remedies, or the rules of decision by which the 
court adjudicate[s] either.”343  Understanding substantive rules as those that 
alter “the rights themselves” is vital to the analysis to come below. 
Shady Grove also provides a second important point.  The particular 
question before the Court was whether Rule 23 of the FRCP which, as 
discussed above, provides the conditions upon which a class action may be 
maintained, is procedural and thus valid under the REA.344  Applying its 
newly articulated test, the Court held that Rule 23 is valid because, like 
other forms of joinder, a class action “merely enables a federal court to 
adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in separate suits.”345  
A class action is procedural because it “leaves the parties’ legal rights and 
duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged,” even if it has significant 
“incidental effect[s]” on the likelihood or nature of claims that it enables.346  
Thus, for purposes of Erie choice of law analysis, use of class actions is a 
procedural, not substantive, right. 
B.  The Substance/Procedure Dichotomy and Arbitration Agreements 
A similar analysis in distinguishing substance and procedure implicitly 
guides courts’ determination as to whether to enforce terms in arbitration 
agreements.  Both an agreement to submit a claim to arbitration and a 
decision to remove a state claim to federal court are choices of forum for 
resolution of disputes.347  Predispute arbitration agreements serve as a 
“specialized kind of forum-selection clause” that set both “the situs of the 
suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.”348  
Similarly, removal to federal court changes the site of the suit and results in 
the implementation of federal procedural rules.349  Unsurprisingly then, the 
Supreme Court’s increasing acceptance of procedural modifications through 
both forum selection clauses and arbitration agreements have developed in 
tandem in recent decades.350  As is true for the FRCP, arbitration 
 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)). 
 343. Id. at 1443. 
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agreements are valid and enforceable because they modify only the 
procedural rights of the parties, the “‘manner and the means by which the 
litigants’ rights are enforced.’”351 
Where an arbitration agreement modifies only the procedure of 
adjudicating a dispute, courts with increasing stringency enforce the 
agreement pursuant to the FAA.352  Typical examples of procedural rights 
that can be modified through an arbitration agreement are the scope of 
discovery353 and rules of evidence,354 as these leave the rights themselves 
that are being adjudicated unaffected.  The same is generally true for 
predispute agreements to arbitrate a statutory claim.  By agreeing to 
arbitration, “a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the 
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a 
judicial, forum.”355  If an arbitration agreement only changes the forum in 
which a dispute is resolved, then the FAA mandates that a reviewing court 
enforce the agreement as written.356  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has 
held that a predispute agreement to arbitrate does not interfere with a 
party’s ability to bring substantive claims under antitrust,357 securities,358 
age discrimination,359 or misrepresentations in advertising statutes;360 the 
substantive claim is adjudicated through the agreed upon arbitration 
procedures rather than standard judicial procedures. 
However, where terms of an arbitration agreement do interfere with 
substantive rights of the parties, courts have declared the terms 
unenforceable and have either severed the offending clauses or invalidated 
the entire arbitration agreement.  For example, because Title VII provides 
for statutory punitive damages, parties cannot agree to ban such damages 
for Title VII claims brought in arbitration.361  The same is true for punitive 
 
 351. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 325 U.S. 
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 356. See supra notes 90–101 and accompanying text. 
 357. See supra notes 68–82 and accompanying text. 
 358. See supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra notes 90–101 and accompanying text. 
 360. See supra notes 102–12 and accompanying text. 
 361. See Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 478 n.14 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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damages permissible under the D.C. Human Rights Act362 and treble 
damages in federal antitrust claims.363  In all of these, enforcing the 
arbitration agreement would displace a statutory remedy, a substantive 
component of the statute.364  Refusing to enforce such agreements is 
consistent with the Supreme Court dicta in Mitsubishi and Gilmer that 
clauses in arbitration agreements that interfere with statutory rights or 
remedies are invalid.365  Thus, while a party can be bound to resolve a Title 
VII employment dispute in arbitration rather than in court, previously 
agreed upon limits on damages must be lifted to allow the underlying 
statute to “function fully and adequately under the law.”366 
The Supreme Court undertook this process of disentangling substantive 
and procedural components of a statute in Rodriguez de Quijas.367  The 
Court enforced waiver through arbitration of “procedural components” of 
the Securities Act, which included provisions regarding federal venue, 
service of process, and removal requirements.368  However, the Court 
implied that it would not have enforced a waiver of the burden-of-proof 
stipulation, as that is a substantive component of the statute.369  The 
differentiation seems to closely track Shady Grove, as waiver of procedural 
components of the statute would alter “‘the manner and the means by which 
the litigants’ rights are enforced,’” while waiver of substantive components 
would alter “‘the rules of decision by which the court . . . adjudicate[s].’”370  
Thus, the Shady Grove framework is a logical way to analyze the 
enforceability of class waivers in employment arbitration agreements. 
C.  The Substantive Nature of Class Proceedings As Protected by the NLRA 
The final step is to apply this framework to determine if employees’ right 
to invoke classwide proceedings is a procedural right that can be 
enforceably waived under the FAA or a substantive right that cannot be 
enforceably waived in predispute arbitration agreements.  Underlying the 
analysis is the Supreme Court’s holding in Shady Grove that use of Rule 23 
to bring a class action is a procedural, not a substantive, right.371  Rule 23 
and use of class actions more generally are procedural rights because they 
“leave[] the parties’ legal rights and duties intact and the rules of decision 
unchanged.”372  The Court in Concepcion similarly viewed class arbitration 
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as a procedural right that cannot be forced on a party absent explicit 
agreement, akin to altering the rules of discovery or evidence.373 
However, unlike Rule 23 and other class mechanisms meant simply to 
aggregate similar claims, the nature of the right here is different.  Viewed 
through the Shady Grove framework, when employees seek to use 
classwide proceedings as a form of collected activity for their mutual aid or 
protection, the right is substantive, not procedural.  This conclusion follows 
from the NLRA itself.  The discrete purpose of the NLRA is to strengthen 
the ability of workers to organize through collective activities.374  
Protection of employees’ ability to act collectively is the “fundamental 
right” of the NLRA and “guarantees employees the most basic rights of 
industrial self-determination.”375  Because Section 7 rights are so 
fundamental, an individual employee cannot waive them contractually, even 
if doing so would be to the individual employee’s benefit.376  The violation 
of Section 7 and the harm to the employee occurs at the moment he is 
presented with an employment agreement with an offending term, even if 
he has suffered no subsequent harm by the employer and even if the 
employer has made no attempt to enforce the illegal term.377 
For these reasons, as a Section 7 right, an employee’s invocation of 
classwide proceedings is not solely procedural as it was in Shady Grove; it 
is not merely the “‘the manner and the means by which the litigants’ rights 
are enforced.’”378  Invocation of classwide proceedings is the right.  A class 
waiver in an employment arbitration agreement interferes with a substantive 
right—Section 7 protections are, in the words of Shady Grove, “the rights 
themselves” for which a party seeks relief from the NLRB or the courts.379  
As such, this right cannot be modified in a predispute arbitration agreement, 
and attempts to do so (in the form of a class waiver) must not be enforced. 
This conclusion is entirely consistent with the FAA jurisprudence 
reviewed above.  In Mitsubishi, Rodriguez de Quijas, and Gilmer, 
enforcement of arbitration agreements did not conflict with the parties’ 
ability to seek relief for infringement of their statutory substantive rights for 
antitrust, securities, and age discrimination violations.380  Here, however, 
enforcement of the arbitration agreements, which requires waiving the use 
of class proceedings, directly infringes the right being sought.381  As stated 
in both Mitsubishi and Gilmer, arbitration agreements are unenforceable if 
they interfere with substantive rights.382  In Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion, 
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the plaintiffs’ desired use of classwide proceedings was a procedural right 
because the plaintiffs sought it as a means of expediting or vindicating other 
substantive rights.383  Accordingly, in both, the Court considered whether 
this change in procedure was appropriate given the agreement of the 
parties.384  Here, however, class proceedings are the substantive right 
protected by statute and, indeed, there is no other substantive right that the 
NLRA serves to protect.  Just as under the Erie doctrine, removal to federal 
court should not upset the substantive rules of the states, use of arbitration 
rather than the courts should not upset the substantive rights of employees.  
In accordance with the NLRA, employers cannot use an agreement to 
arbitrate as a means of denying employees their substantive right to employ 
classwide proceedings for the resolution of a dispute. 
Understanding the Section 7 right as substantive rather than procedural 
resolves the criticisms raised by the courts that objected to the Board’s D.R. 
Horton holding.385  Refusing to enforce class waivers in employment 
contracts does not run afoul of the holding of Stolt-Nielsen or Concepcion 
by creating a conflict with the FAA, because the FAA has never been held 
to mandate the enforcement of arbitration agreements that waive 
substantive rights.386  Rather, the cases consistently hold that parties can 
and should use predispute arbitration agreements as a means of modifying 
only their procedural rights, whether arising under federal statutes or not. 
Furthermore, there is no conflict between the NLRA and the FAA because 
refusing to enforce a class waiver does not require compelled class 
arbitration.387  Rather, employers need only “leave[] open a judicial forum 
for class and collective claims,”388 and so would not be compelled into a 
type of arbitration with which they did not agree.389  Where there is no 
conflict between the NLRA and the FAA, the CompuCredit “contrary 
congressional command” test to resolve statutory conflict is irrelevant.390  
Infringing a substantive right takes the enforceability of an arbitration 
agreement outside of the FAA’s mandate and, as the Supreme Court has 
consistently held, such agreements are unenforceable. 
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CONCLUSION 
Over the last few decades, the Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA to 
afford great discretion in allowing parties to use arbitration agreements to 
alter the procedural rules by which their disputes will be resolved.  
Recently, the Court held that this discretion generally includes the ability to 
waive classwide proceedings in the resolution of future disputes.  However, 
discretion in structuring arbitration agreements has never been extended to 
permit waiver of substantive rights protected by statute.  One such 
unwaivable substantive right is invocation of classwide proceedings under 
Section 7 of the NLRA.  Accordingly, refusing to enforce predispute 
arbitration agreements that waive this right creates no conflict with the 
FAA.  As the NLRB correctly held in D.R. Horton, employment arbitration 
agreements with class waivers must be declared unenforceable. 
